# Condition CP

### 1NC

#### <<INSERT PLAN>> if and only if the Cuban government implements economic liberalization reforms, including engaging international financial institutions and reducing restrictions on foreign direct investment.

#### Only the counterplan solves Cuban growth and democracy – US engagement in economic liberalization ensures stable transition post-Castro. And they’d say yes.

Perez 2010

[David A. Perez, Yale Law School, JD, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, Spring, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187, America’s Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, p. 206-10]

The United States should recognize that economic change is a precursor to political change. To that end, the Obama Administration should craft its Cuba policy to emphasize and encourage economic liberalization, rather than focusing on political conditions. (4A) Economic Liberalization Precedes Political Liberalization American policymakers should adopt another type of Copernican shift: instead of placing political reforms (i.e., free elections) at the center of our Cuba policy, the U.S. should make economic reforms the gravitational locus of our diplomatic efforts. This shift would not lose track of or diminish the importance of political change, but would simply acknowledge that such political change necessarily orbits economic change, and not the other way around. Put differently, changing our point of view does not change our objectives – it only changes the means by which we pursue our objectives. The notion of offering a quid pro quo – easing restrictions for genuine irreversible reform – has always been impossible because of Fidel’s stubborn personality. Once he is out of the picture permanently, there would be no other leader who could maintain such rigidity in the face of genuine and constructive engagement from Washington. Reform-oriented leaders will feel less pressure to remain silent, while the government itself will feel more pressure from the populace to address the growing concerns on the island. While Fidel Castro has always exuded confidence in his leadership, in the immediate wake of his death the Cuban regime is sure to feel a tremendous amount of insecurity, which, if handled properly and respectfully, could strengthen Washington’s political hand. At that point, the best – indeed, the only – way to have leverage in Cuba, is for America to engage the island directly. However, Washington’s policy for the last fifty years has focused almost exclusively on the political situation (i.e., free and fair elections). This myopic approach has ignored the possibility of doing an end-run around Castro’s political recalcitrance by simply giving the Cuban people (and government) an offer they can’t refuse: economic success. As long as the political arena remains the battlefield upon which Washington and Havana wage their ideological war, there will always be stalemate. Transitions from other Cold War-era governments demonstrate that economic liberalization helped facilitate political liberalization. In Poland, the labor unions flourished before political parties were finally established after the fall of the Soviet Union; in Russia, mass privatization paved the way for moderate political freedoms; in Vietnam, the government started to embrace market-based reforms in the mid to late-1980s; and finally, in China, an unmistakably capitalist society has emerged, although elections have still not been held. Cuba will be no different. In early 2009, the Cuban government approved the largest land distribution since the revolution when it handed out 45,500 land grants to the private sector. Another reason economic reforms are likely to precede political reforms is that the population seems hungrier to see an economic respite after decades of austerity. This may also be a result of their belief that the Cuban regime will try to maintain its monopolistic grip on politics for as long as possible, even if it loosens its grip on the economy. When Raul Castro began his version of a “listening tour” around the island he also initiated a series of debates. During one of these town hall meetings Ricardo Alarcon, the leader of the National Assembly as of April 2009, was barraged with questions that focused on the economy – specifically Cuba’s dual-currency system. Although such intimate private-public participation has been rare on the totalitarian island, once the window of opportunity was opened, a burst of activity flowed through. Reloading the diplomatic cannon by encouraging economic reform, rather than focusing on political reform, would represent a more dynamic approach to U.S.-Cuban relations. (4B) Washington’s Policies Should Encourage Economic Liberalization The importance of this argument cannot be overstated. The fact that economic reforms will precede political reforms means at least two things. First, given this ordering, any quid pro quo from Washington should provide due credit to any economic liberalization that the island may implement, however piecemeal. For example, when the Cuban government privatizes parcels of agricultural land, or when it allows its tourist industry to engage in the dollar economy, or when it allows its taxi drivers to charge their own rates, these reforms should be seen as the economic equivalent of allowing small-scale political pluralism. When economic reforms are implemented, they should be praised – not belittled – and followed by positive reinforcement by Washington. Second, since these economic changes will be prerequisites for any significant political reforms on the island, Washington should focus its short-term diplomatic efforts on an open Cuban market, rather than an open Cuban polity. This might mean easing or restructuring, though not necessarily fully eliminating, restrictions on trade, travel, and remittances, in order to encourage more private economic activity. In these ways, the U.S. can help awaken Cuba’s nascent economic society, providing the necessary impetus for political reform. Another method Washington can use to lure Cuba into economic reform is membership into the international financial community. The World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the Inter-American Development Bank each have rules for borrowing money and can encourage liberalization in Cuba by making their respective funds available as a carrot to incentivize liberalization. These regional and global economic organizations have rules and procedures that are technically independent of the U.S. Congress. By couching these reforms in terms of obligations to transnational financial organizations, any economic progress can be insulated from the anti-American rhetoric that would otherwise follow their painful implementation. Ending the U.S. opposition to the reengagement of the international financial community with Cuba would go a long way toward promoting economic liberalization. (4C) The Economic Transition Will Be Slow Policymakers in Washington must realize that Cubans will not wake up the day after Fidel Castro dies and experience broad-based attitudinal changes. Therefore, while economic reform is sure to preface political reform, the Cuban government will have to move slowly on the former so as not to alienate the population, which would truncate the latter. At first, a successor regime may think that choosing between Castroism and economic liberalization is a Faustian choice: economic doldrums with continuity versus economic revitalization with instability. Indeed, continuing Castroism embraces the history and normative values attached to the Revolution, but would forestall any economic recovery. On the other hand, liberalizing the economy by adopting market reforms would promote economic growth, but could also alienate large segments of the population still enamored by Castro’s revolutionary zeal. For example, one possible market reform would be to lay off the excess workforce that has cluttered the state-controlled enterprises and rendered them inefficient and virtually useless. Embracing deep cuts in the public employment might be efficient, but it certainly will not be popular. For decades Cubans have enjoyed job security, universal education, and universal healthcare. If market reforms are interpreted as a wholesale rejection of the normative and ideological underpinnings that have dominated Cuban discourse for the last fifty years, they will no doubt alienate influential ideologues in the Communist Party, the military, the Ministry of the Interior, and many others in the general population. When a state takes control of the economy, it also takes responsibility for it when it performs poorly. A strong state could surely implement these reforms and survive the ensuing backlash; but to do so would require deft political maneuvering, and a careful patience to not try to change everything all at once. A poorly managed state-led economic opening can quickly become unmanageable, and create instability. Given these concerns, a slow and methodical economic transition, rather than an overnight toppling of the state-sector, would be a far more pragmatic approach for the Cuban government. China and Vietnam have both introduced market reforms that dwarf any that the Cuban regime has introduced so far. Given that China has been on the path of liberalization for over thirty years yet the state still controls wide swaths of the economy, one might expect Cuba’s economic transformation to also move lethargically – especially at first. The stronger the parallel with Asia becomes, the more methodical Cuba’s opening will be. Expectations that assume a quick economic turnaround should be correspondingly adjusted. Thus, the United States should recognize that the Cuban government has little choice but to move at a relatively glacial speed, and instead work assiduously to make the economic transition as smooth as possible. To that end, it is absolutely crucial that our policies not be used as a way to settle political grudges. For example, if America moves to regain the properties taken by the Cuban government fifty years ago as a way to “encourage” market reforms, the entire effort will be short-circuited before it takes off the ground. Some will argue that focusing on market liberalization, while putting political reforms to the side, endangers Cuba’s long-term prospects for liberty and freedom. This is a valid concern. Nevertheless, in normative terms, market reforms will vastly improve the lives of the Cuban people. The improved living conditions will give fringe groups with few resources the ability to focus their own efforts on political reform from within. Improved economic conditions, if used as a prerequisite to political reform, may also prevent a costly civil war during the inevitably painful transition.

#### Unstable transition causes Caribbean terrorism, regional instability, and turns the case

Gorrell 2005

[Tim, Lieutenant Colonel, “CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED STRATEGIC CRISIS?” 3/18, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074]

Regardless of the succession, under the current U.S. policy, Cuba’s problems of a post Castro transformation only worsen. In addition to Cubans on the island, there will be those in exile who will return claiming authority. And there are remnants of the dissident community within Cuba who will attempt to exercise similar authority. A power vacuum or absence of order will create the conditions for instability and civil war. Whether Raul or another successor from within the current government can hold power is debatable. However, that individual will nonetheless extend the current policies for an indefinite period, which will only compound the Cuban situation. When Cuba finally collapses anarchy is a strong possibility if the U.S. maintains the “wait and see” approach. The U.S. then must deal with an unstable country 90 miles off its coast. In the midst of this chaos, thousands will flee the island. During the Mariel boatlift in 1980 125,000 fled the island.26 Many were criminals; this time the number could be several hundred thousand fleeing to the U.S., creating a refugee crisis.¶ Equally important, by adhering to a negative containment policy, the U.S. may be creating its next series of transnational criminal problems. Cuba is along the axis of the drug-trafficking flow into the U.S. from Columbia. The Castro government as a matter of policy does not support the drug trade. In fact, Cuba’s actions have shown that its stance on drugs is more than hollow rhetoric as indicated by its increasing seizure of drugs – 7.5 tons in 1995, 8.8 tons in 1999, and 13 tons in 2000.27 While there may be individuals within the government and outside who engage in drug trafficking and a percentage of drugs entering the U.S. may pass through Cuba, the Cuban government is not the path of least resistance for the flow of drugs. If there were no Cuban restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S. could be greatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation and accelerate considerably.¶ In the midst of an unstable Cuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist groups to operate in the region increases. If these groups can export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S. or throughout the hemisphere then the war against this extremism gets more complicated. Such activity could increase direct attacks and disrupt the economies, threatening the stability of the fragile democracies that are budding throughout the region. In light of a failed state in the region, the U.S. may be forced to deploy military forces to Cuba, creating the conditions for another insurgency. The ramifications of this action could very well fuel greater anti-American sentiment throughout the Americas. A proactive policy now can mitigate these potential future problems.¶ U.S. domestic political support is also turning against the current negative policy. The Cuban American population in the U.S. totals 1,241,685 or 3.5% of the population.28 Most of these exiles reside in Florida; their influence has been a factor in determining the margin of victory in the past two presidential elections. But this election strategy may be flawed, because recent polls of Cuban Americans reflect a decline for President Bush based on his policy crackdown. There is a clear softening in the Cuban-American community with regard to sanctions. Younger Cuban Americans do not necessarily subscribe to the hard-line approach. These changes signal an opportunity for a new approach to U.S.-Cuban relations. (Table 1)¶ The time has come to look realistically at the Cuban issue. Castro will rule until he dies. The only issue is what happens then? The U.S. can little afford to be distracted by a failed state 90 miles off its coast. The administration, given the present state of world affairs, does not have the luxury or the resources to pursue the traditional American model of crisis management. The President and other government and military leaders have warned that the GWOT will be long and protracted. These warnings were sounded when the administration did not anticipate operations in Iraq consuming so many military, diplomatic and economic resources. There is justifiable concern that Africa and the Caucasus region are potential hot spots for terrorist activity, so these areas should be secure. North Korea will continue to be an unpredictable crisis in waiting. We also cannot ignore China. What if China resorts to aggression to resolve the Taiwan situation? Will the U.S. go to war over Taiwan? Additionally, Iran could conceivably be the next target for U.S. pre-emptive action. These are known and potential situations that could easily require all or many of the elements of national power to resolve. In view of such global issues, can the U.S. afford to sustain the status quo and simply let the Cuban situation play out? The U.S. is at a crossroads: should the policies of the past 40 years remain in effect with vigor? Or should the U.S. pursue a new approach to Cuba in an effort to facilitate a manageable transition to post-Castro Cuba?

#### Latin American instability sparks global WMD conflict, terrorism, starvation, and human rights violations

Manwaring 2005

[Max, ,Professor of Military Strategy @ U.S. Army War College, Retired U.S. Army colonel and an Adjunct Professor of International Politics at Dickinson College, VENEZUELA’S HUGO CHÁVEZ, BOLIVARIAN SOCIALISM, AND ASYMMETRIC WARFARE, October 2005, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub628.pdf>]

The Issue of State Failure. - President **Chávez** also **understands** that the process leading to state failure is the most dangerous long-term security challenge facing the global community today. The argument in general is **that failing and failed state status is the breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism. These conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee flows. They can host “evil” networks** of all kinds, whether they involve **criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking**, or some form of ideological crusade such as Bolivarianismo. More specifically, these conditions spawn all kinds of things people in general do not like such as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of infrastructure. **These means of coercion and persuasion can spawn further human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation, disease, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism, and criminal anarchy**. At the same time, **these actions are** usually **unconfined and spill over into regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict**.62 ¶ Peru’s Sendero Luminoso calls violent and destructive activities that facilitate the processes of state failure “armed propaganda.” Drug cartels operating throughout the Andean Ridge of South America and elsewhere call these activities “business incentives.” Chávez considers these actions to be steps that must be taken to bring about the political conditions necessary to establish Latin American socialism for the 21st century.63 Thus, in addition to helping to provide wider latitude to further their tactical and operational objectives, state and nonstate actors’ strategic efforts are aimed at progressively lessening a targeted regime’s credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness to govern and develop its national territory and society. Chávez’s intent is to focus his primary attack politically and psychologically on selected Latin American governments’ ability and right to govern. In that context, he understands that popular perceptions of corruption, disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given regime to conduct the business of the state. Until a given populace generally perceives that its government is dealing with these and other basic issues of political, economic, and social injustice fairly and effectively, instability and the threat of subverting or destroying such a government are real.64 ¶ But failing and failed states simply do not go away. Virtually anyone can take advantage of such an unstable situation. The tendency is that the best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will control that instability. As a consequence**, failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states, narco-states**, or new people’s democracies. In connection with the creation of new people’s democracies, one can rest assured that Chávez and his Bolivarian populist allies will be available to provide money, arms, and leadership at any given opportunity. And, of course, **the longer dysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states and people’s democracies persist, the more they and their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity**.65

### Overview

#### Terrorists will use Latin America to launch bioweapons

Bryan 2001

[Anthony T. Bryan, director of the North-South Center’s Caribbean Program, 10-21-2001. CFR, Terrorism, Porous Borders, and Homeland Security: The Case for U.S.-Caribbean Cooperation, p.  
http://www.cfr.org/publication/4844/terrorism\_porous\_borders\_and%20\_homeland\_%20security.html]

Terrorist acts can take place anywhere. The Caribbean is no exception. Already the linkages between drug trafficking and terrorism are clear in countries like Colombia and Peru, and such connections have similar potential in the Caribbean. The security of major industrial complexes in some Caribbean countries is vital. Petroleum refineries and major industrial estates in Trinidad, which host more than 100 companies that produce the majority of the world’s methanol, ammonium sulphate, and 40 percent of U.S. imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG), are vulnerable targets. Unfortunately, as experience has shown in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, terrorists are likely to strike at U.S. and European interests in Caribbean countries. Security issues become even more critical when one considers the possible use of Caribbean countries by terrorists as bases from which to attack the United States. An airliner hijacked after departure from an airport in the northern Caribbean or the Bahamas can be flying over South Florida in less than an hour. Terrorists can sabotage or seize control of a cruise ship after the vessel leaves a Caribbean port. Moreover, terrorists with false passports and visas issued in the Caribbean may be able to move easily through passport controls in Canada or the United States. (To help counter this possibility, some countries have suspended "economic citizenship" programs to ensure that known terrorists have not been inadvertently granted such citizenship.) Again, Caribbean countries are as vulnerable as anywhere else to the clandestine manufacture and deployment of biological weapons within national borders.

#### Risk of bioweapons acquisition is high

Global Security 2012

[“Biological Weapons”, September 21, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/cuba/bw.htm]

Cuba is not reported to possess chemical weapons, nor are there credible reports of Cuban posession of long range ballistic missiles. Cuba is regarded by some as having a program of research on biological warfare agents, though the scope and focus of this effort remains obscure and controversial. The State Department’s 2005 compliance report states that Cuba likely “has the technical capability to pursue some aspects of offensive BW.” However, U.S. officials disagree as to whether Cuba has, or has ever had, a biological weapons program. Public health has been a high priority sector for the Cuban government since the late 1950s. As a result, the Cuban population enjoys one of the highest life expectancies at 75.2 years, and one of the lowest infant mortality rates (9.7 per 1,000 live births). Cuba's accomplishments in primary care involve low-technology and organizational innovations such as neighborhood-based family medicine. Vaccination is a major focus of the Cuban health system, whose childhood immunization program has led to the eradication of measles, mumps and polio, as well as a 30-fold decrease in the incidence of meningitis. There are projects to develop vaccines against salmonella and dengue haemorrhagic fever -- a particularly difficult project, as vaccines must be effective against all four dengue viruses to prevent disease. Cuba's biotechnology industry is one of the most advanced in emerging countries. Fidel Castro has vowed that Cuba will become the only developing nation to be a significant player in the world's biotechnology and pharmaceuticals industries, and a concerted national effort instigated by Castro himself has made independent progress unmatched elsewhere in the developing world. Cuban biotech research has added several vaccines to the national immunization program, and is responsible for drugs such as recombinant streptokinase, the "clot-buster" for heart attack victims produced at a fraction of the cost of imports. Cuba has produced a number of valuable medicinal goods, such as epiderman growth factor and policosanol (PPG), an oral medication derived from sugar cane that lowers cholesterol and atherogenic lipoproteins. Cuba has expanded the production of interferons, monoclonal antibodies, interleukins, and thrombolytic agents, for both export and internal use. But the sector was largely based on imitating patented vaccines, which cannot be sold in countries that respect patent laws. Cuba sells products medical primarily to former Soviet states, and third world countries. In 1994, Cuba exported $110 million worth of medical supplies. In 1995, this figure rose to $125 million. These earnings have been used to support and subsidize Cuba's biomedical research programs. Biotechnology is not yet a major exporter like the sugar cane or tobacco industries, but it could be an important part of the economy in the future. The two main sectors in which the Cuban economy is specifically targeting for international investment are the tourism and biotechnology industries. In October 1999 the Anglo-U.S. health care group SmithKline Beecham, annunced details of an agreement to test and market a Cuban meningitis vaccine. The company plans to sell the drug in Europe first but eventually take it to the United States. The agreement represented a breakthrough for Cuba's fledgling biotechnology industry. The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (CDA) permits US firms and their subsidiaries to apply for licenses to sell medicines or medical equipment to the island, provided there is no reasonable likelihood the item will be used in the production of any biotechnology product. The Cuban Democracy Act also explicitly bans exports for Cuba's biotechnology research and production. Regulations require US sellers to keep track of products until they are delivered to end users, in order to prevent US goods from being used in the Cuban biotechnology sector. The advances achieved by Cuba regarding biological safety in the late 1990s were significant. The National Authority for the control of biological safety was created, which has a national, territorial level and with the Cuban biotechnology plants. Cuba would be capable of producing biological warfare agents, and Cuba's biotechnology industry could produce many types of toxins. Defector reports claim that the civilian-run Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology in Havana is a "front" for a military research center that manufactures anthrax and bubonic plague.

#### **That comparatively outweighs case**

Singer 2001

[Clifford Singer, Director of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security at the University of Illinois at Urbana—Champaign. “Will Mankind Survive the Millennium?” The Bulletin of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 13.1, <http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/> research/S&Ps/2001-Sp/S&P\_ XIII/Singer.htm Published Spring 2001]

In recent years the fear of the apocalypse (or religious hope for it) has been in part a child of the Cold War, but its seeds in Western culture go back to the Black Death and earlier. Recent polls suggest that the majority in the United States that believe man would survive into the future for substantially less than a millennium was about 10 percent higher in the Cold War than afterward. However fear of annihilation of the human species through nuclear warfare was confused with the admittedly terrifying, but much different matter of destruction of a dominant civilization. The destruction of a third or more of much of the globe’s population through the disruption from the direct consequences of nuclear blast and fire damage was certainly possible. There was, and still is, what is now known to be a rather small chance that dust raised by an all-out nuclear war would cause a so called nuclear winter, substantially reducing agricultural yields especially in temperate regions for a year or more. As noted above mankind as a whole has weathered a number of mind-boggling disasters in the past fifty thousand years even if older cultures or civilizations have sometimes eventually given way to new ones in the process. Moreover the fear that radioactive fallout would make the globe uninhabitable, publicized by widely seen works such as “On the Beach,” was a metaphor for the horror of nuclear war rather than reality. The epidemiological lethal results of well over a hundred atmospheric nuclear tests are barely statistically detectable except in immediate fallout plumes. The increase in radiation exposure far from the combatants in even a full scale nuclear exchange at the height of the Cold War would have been modest compared to the variations in natural background radiation doses that have readily been adapted to by a number of human populations. Nor is there any reason to believe that global warming or other insults to our physical environment resulting from currently used technologies will challenge the survival of mankind as a whole beyond what it has already handily survived through the past fifty thousand years. There are, however, two technologies currently under development that may pose a more serious threat to human survival. The first and most immediate is biological warfare combined with genetic engineering. Smallpox is the most fearsome of natural biological warfare agents in existence. By the end of the next decade, global immunity to smallpox will likely be at a low unprecedented since the emergence of this disease in the distant past, while the opportunity for it to spread rapidly across the globe will be at an all time high. In the absence of other complications such as nuclear war near the peak of an epidemic, developed countries may respond with quarantine and vaccination to limit the damage. Otherwise mortality there may match the rate of 30 percent or more expected in unprepared developing countries. With respect to genetic engineering using currently available knowledge and technology, the simple expedient of spreading an ample mixture of coat protein variants could render a vaccination response largely ineffective, but this would otherwise not be expected to substantially increase overall mortality rates. With development of new biological technology, however, there is a possibility that a variety of infectious agents may be engineered for combinations of greater than natural virulence and mortality, rather than just to overwhelm currently available antibiotics or vaccines. There is no a priori known upper limit to the power of this type of technology base, and thus the survival of a globally connected human family may be in question when and if this is achieved.

## Solvency

### Say Yes – Foreign Investment

#### Cuba would say yes – positive engagement key to inclusion into international financial institutions

Armeni 2012

[Andrea, The Frontier Post, “Re-engaging Cuba”, April 30, Lexis]

To emerge from its doldrums, Cuba must offer itself as more than a pawn on the Western chessboard. Cuba's recovery requires a fundamental overhaul of its dysfunctional centrally planned economy and Orwellian state. Cuba must find new ways of engaging with the world - and that requires fundamental changes how the country is run. No country longing for an international presence can afford to have a fictitious dual currency regime and a state apparatus that employs 80 per cent of the work force. Aware of the challenges, President Raul Castro pushed through a series of detailed economic reforms in 2011 - more than 300 in all - that, if properly implemented, will lead to a more open economy, including self-employment, a smaller state sector, the legalisation of real estate transactions. The implementation is slow and painful. The leadership is, however, adamant that economic reform does not forebode political changes: In fact, the economic reforms are a means of ensuring the survival through change of Cuba's brand of socialism. There's no question that a stronger private sector and more openness toward the rest of the world would wield political changes in Cuba - giving a plausible excuse to the United States to progressively ease the 50-year embargo and allowing a gradual rapprochement with the international financial institutions that Cuba abandoned in the 1960s. Aside from US opposition, it makes no sense for the international financial institutions to exclude Cuba, given their universalist mandate - with the exception of Cuba, North Korea and some micro-states - and history of engagement with needy economies regardless of political proclivities, from Vietnam to Nicaragua. Cuba has given weak signals that it welcomes such help. This is likely to be a slow process, but one that institutions should undertake. While there have been signs that engagement might accomplish more than hardline exclusionism, the US approach still prevails. The Summit of the Americas would have been a prime forum for recognising Cuba's attempts at openness and pushing it ahead with carrots, not sticks. President Obama indicated his country's openness to having Cuba take part in future summits if the country advances toward democracy. Pressure toward inclusion from the other OAS countries is mounting, and it will be none too soon when Cuba will be allowed to re-engage.

#### Cuba is willing to engage IFIs – international pressure is key

French 2011

[Anya Landau, Christian Science Monitor, “How the IMF and World Bank could save Cuba's economy – defying the US embargo”, http://www.csmonitor.com/layout/set/print/World/Americas/Latin-America-Monitor/2011/1118/How-the-IMF-and-World-Bank-could-save-Cuba-s-economy-defying-the-US-embargo]

I’ll admit that after reading Professor Feinberg’s introduction, I next skipped to the middle for both a history lesson and a pragmatic, creative vision for Raul Castro’s Cuba to reconnect with the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) – the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as well as with regional development banks – in spite of opposition from the United States. Feinberg unravels the conventional wisdom that says Cuba and the IFIs would make unhappy bedfellows – Cuba withdrew from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund more than 40 years ago – by pointing to successful IFI engagement with nonmembers like Kosovo and South Sudan, and with proud and strong states like Daniel Ortega's Nicaragua and Vietnam, with which Cuba shares key similarities. The IFIs are more interested in “the long game,” Feinberg argues, and their willingness to take things step by step would fit nicely with Cuba’s (urgent) need for gradual changes. He talks to both sides, and a senior Cuban diplomat tells him that “Cuba has no principled position against” engagement with the IFIs – a statement Feinberg believes signals a real shift in Cuban policy (hopefully a Cuban official will field that question publicly in the not too distant future). Meanwhile, IFI experts are more than ready to engage Cuba, and Feinberg argues that US opposition to IFI assistance isn’t as insurmountable as it might seem. In particular, IFIs can work through trust funds and other donors can administer programs. Feinberg also sees a role for regional development banks such as the Inter-American Development Bank and the Andean Development Corporation, as the US isn’t a member. At a time when the United States is noticeable absent and seemingly oblivious to the critical moment at hand in Cuba, Feinberg offers immediate, actionable recommendations for the international development community to engage Cuba now, when it can clearly have a tremendous impact on the breadth, depth and success of the reforms. His recommendations for the IFIs, Cuban policymakers, and the United States include: The IFIs must build up their Cuba expertise up now, and begin to develop a relationship built on “small confidence-building measures” (Feinberg offers specific examples of what that would look like) and working with other partners to work around statutory U.S. opposition to traditional IFI assistance to Cuba; Cuba must with all “deliberate speed” implement its announced reforms to inspire confidence of trading partners, donors and lenders, should complement its South-South strategy with re-invigorated collaboration with Canada and Europe, and should reach out to the IFIs for technical consultations; The United States must better grasp the significance of the economic reforms underway in Cuba, and pursue policies that encourage greater economic reform. In particular, the U.S. must not stand in the way of IFI engagement of Cuba. After all, as one senior staffer on Capitol Hill remarked to Feinberg, would Congress really object to, “Asking the Cubans to enter the Temples of Communist Doom?” What makes this report so refreshing and timely is that it doesn’t need to retread the failure of US policy to achieve its goals on the island, nor is it about the crucial role the United States should play but isn’t in Cuba’s economic reforms. In the run-up to the 2012 presidential election, the Obama administration surely, however mistakenly, sees its hands as tied on more progressive Cuba policies fiercely opposed by a small but forceful segment of the Cuban American community in Florida. And it may well be best that the United States just stays out of the way, as too much interest from the Enemy to the North could politicize an already sensitive reform process. As Feinberg has hit upon, the real players at bat should be the world’s best, brightest and most experienced economists, who are champing at the bit to help their Cuban counterparts achieve reforms everyone – well, almost everyone – wants to succeed.

#### US engagement is key – brings Cuba into the international community

AFP 2009

[“US should bring Cuba into IMF: fund official”, May 16, Lexis]

US President Barack Obama's administration should work to bringing Cuba back into international bodies such as the IMF, a Brazilian official in the fund said Saturday. Paulo Nogueira Batista, an executive director representing Brazil and a group of eight Latin American countries in the International Monetary Fund, stressed during a world tourism conference in Brazil his opinion was personal and not that of the fund. "I think it is a big disappointment that the new American administration, that has come in committed change and to reviewing certain policies, has not really moved forward in terms of bringing Cuba back into the international community," he told the Global Travel and Tourism meeting in the city of Florianopolis. The comment added to a chorus of officials and businessmen in Latin America calling for the United States to ease its isolation of Cuba which includes exclusion of regional bodies and a 47-year-old economic embargo on the island. A Latin American summit in Brazil last December issued a joint appeal for the end of the embargo. Cuban President Raul Castro in April also said he was willing to discuss "everything" including touchy human rights issues with Washington. Despite that, and a US lifting of travel and money transfer restrictions on Americans with relatives in Cuba, there has been no breakthrough in icy ties between the Cold War enemies. Obama has said US policy to Cuba will not be changed until the communist island shows progress on human rights. A senior US State Department official, James Steinberg, told a gathering at the Organization of American States last Wednesday: "The United States seeks a new beginning with Cuba and we have changed our policy in ways that we believe will advance liberty and create opportunity for the Cuban people."

### Say Yes – Embargo Key

#### Cuba says yes

Perez 2010

[David A. Yale Law School, JD, Harvard Latino Law Review, Spring, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187, America’s Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, p. 216-7]

After conducting some initial discussions, both countries can then move on to the embargo. No one argues that the embargo is an effective foreign policy, because it has clearly failed to bring about real reform on the island; the only argument for maintaining the embargo is that it can be used as a bargaining chip for more dialogue – not that in its current state it can lead to a better situation. Put differently, the embargo is only valuable to the extent that its removal can be part of a quid pro quo strategy – not that its maintenance will lead to fundamental reform on the island. This reveals a bifurcated myopia that affects both sides of the debate. On the one hand those who support the embargo as a negotiating chip often gloss over the fact that its continuation will not lead to regime change. On the other hand, those who focus on the embargo’s inability to topple the regime and instead support lifting the embargo unconditionally, generally give too little weight to the embargo’s value during diplomatic negotiations. The Helms-Burton legislation lays out the rather onerous conditions that must be met on Cuba’s end before the U.S. can begin restoring diplomatic relations. The significance of Helms-Burton’s restraints cannot be overstated: while a particular president’s rhetoric or a particular resolution’s wording might chill diplomatic relations between two countries, Helms-Burton’s arduous provisions freeze relations. The onus to thaw that freeze is properly placed upon Washington, rather than Havana. It is therefore incumbent upon the United States to change its own laws before any rapprochement with Cuba can begin. Invariably the debate surrounding America’s embargo revolves around its solvency: has it worked? The question should instead be reworded to ask: will current U.S. policy work from here on out to achieve certain definable interests? The United States sold the island over $ 700 million in goods in 2008, accounting for 40% of the island’s agricultural imports. That number seems to indicate that Cuba’s trading relationship with the U.S. is not of trivial importance to the island’s leadership. However, the strength of this relationship may steadily diminish relative to other trading partners in the next few years. For example, over the next five to seven years Cuba will have an increased energy productivity stemming from its coastal drilling operations that will bring it closer to Spain, Canada, Norway, Brazil, and India. With these relatively stable flows of capital, Cuba will increasingly become insulated from U.S. economic pressure. The moment to decisively influence Cuba’s government through economic pressure may have never existed, but if it did, it has surely passed. The notion that the U.S. can intricately craft Cuba’s governmental and domestic policies by applying a combination of economic and political pressure must be rejected either as categorically false, or as an anachronism of the early 1990s. During her confirmation hearings, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said “that it is not time to lift the embargo on Cuba, especially since it provides an important source of leverage for further change on the island.” Secretary Clinton is correct: the embargo definitely provides a valuable bargaining chip during negotiations, and should not be lifted unconditionally. But given this evidence, the Obama Administration should be suspect of claims that the embargo gives the U.S. decisive leverage over Cuba. (5G) These Diplomatic Overtures Are Both Sequential and Reversible These first few steps would then allow the United States to begin by engaging Cuba in a multi-lateral framework. The model can mirror the six-party talks held with North Korea, which provide a structure for direct American engagement with the North Korean government. n87 The Cuban government will likely participate since the United States has so much to offer, including the reduction of sanctions, various security guarantees, the promise of normalized relations, and an eventual end to Cuba’s isolation. Combined with these carrots, the United States will also have the stick of increased sanctions, and a reversion back to diplomatic isolation. Policymakers in America often emphasize that any change on America’s end must be met with irreversible change on Cuba’s end, based on the idea that the United States might be offering irreversible carrots for nothing. The underlying premise of that notion is simply wrong: there is no reason to believe that once the United States changes parts of its Cuba policy, it cannot reverse those changes in response to negative behavior in Havana. Concessions the United States makes on many of these issues can be reversed: targeted sanctions can be reapplied after they have been removed; travel bans can be reinstituted after they have been lifted; diplomatic relations can be re-severed after they have been re-established. If the United States normalizes relations with the Cuban government, only to witness the Cuban government imprison or execute hundreds of dissidents, there is no reason why our government could not respond strongly, and even consider reverting back to hostile relations. Establishing relations between Washington and Havana is not an end in itself, nor is it a right that has been taken away from Havana. Instead, normalized relations should properly be seen as a privilege that Cuba has to earn before it is once again offered by the United States. But even if it is offered to Cuba, by no means are any overtures on Washington’s end irreversible.

#### Lack of transparency means embargo is key to bargaining chip

Vidal 2013

[William Vidal, 2-26-13, “What if the US Ended the Cuba Travel Ban and the Embargo”, <http://ontwoshores.com/?p=1785>]

Cuba does not have an independent/transparent legal system. All judges are appointed by the State and all lawyers are licensed by the State. In the last few years, European investors have had over $1 billion arbitrarily frozen by the government and several investments have been confiscated. Cuba’s Law 77 allows the State to expropriate foreign-invested assets for reason of “public utility” or “social interest.” In the last year, the CEOs of three companies with extensive dealings with the Cuban government were arrested without charges. OTS: Again, U.S. companies can look out for their interests… well, you get the gist, even if Suchlicki doesn’t. Conclusions - If the travel ban is lifted unilaterally now or the embargo is ended by the U.S., what will the U.S. government have to negotiate with a future regime in Cuba and to encourage changes in the island? These policies could be an important bargaining chip with a future regime willing to provide concessions in the area of political and economic freedoms.

#### Now is key – term limits provide unique incentives for a grand bargain

Lopez-Levy 2011

[Arturo, a lecturer and PhD Candidate at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver, New America Foundation, “Change In Post-Fidel Cuba: Political Liberalization, Economic Reform and Lessons for U.S. Policy”, http://newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/naf\_all\_cuba\_reform\_final.pdf]

6. Given the fact that Raul Castro endorsed term limits at the VI Congress, his presidency will end in less than seven years. The United States should consider the possibility of offering a “Grand Bargain” in such a way that he can pass in to history as the president under which the embargo ended. American policymakers should recognize the current situation as an ideal opportunity to negotiate an end to the conflict, and a chance for wide-ranging and unfettered interaction with Cuban elites and the whole of Cuban society. It would be a mistake to overestimate the vulnerability of the regime in the face of hostile policies or to personalize the bilateral relations, avoiding negotiation with Raul, just because he is a Castro or a member of the historical generation.

#### Only a condition solves – key leverage against the regime

Currie 2010

[Duncan, National Review, “Spare Not the Stick - With the Cuban regime vulnerable, now is no time to loosen the embargo”, Lexis]

What does all that mean for U.S. sanctions against Cuba? "This is clearly the wrong time to lift the embargo, because the regime is under pressure -- not only internally, but internationally," says former State Department official Susan Kaufman Purcell, director of the Center for Hemispheric Policy at the University of Miami. Moreover, the Castro government has made a habit of scuttling U.S. efforts to improve bilateral relations. When President Ford sought rapprochement, Cuba dispatched a massive number of military personnel to aid Communist forces in the Angolan civil war. When President Carter established a U.S. mission in Havana, Fidel sent thousands of dangerous criminals and mental patients to Florida as part of the Mariel boatlift. When President Clinton loosened the embargo, Cuban aircraft shot down two planes operated by "Brothers to the Rescue," a Cuban-American group that assists seaborne refugees. Similarly, President Obama initially hoped to launch "a new beginning with Cuba." In a gesture of goodwill, he eased restrictions on family travel and remittances to the island. But Havana once again failed to reciprocate: In December, Cuban security agents arrested Alan Gross, a U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) contractor seeking to foster civil society on the island. The regime has since been holding him on trumped-up spying charges. After the Gross detention, USAID-funded trips aimed at nurturing Cuban democracy were temporarily suspended. But on April 9, the Miami Herald reported that the agency had given its partner organizations the green light to resume them. Cuban officials are "really worried" about the USAID programs, says Latell, author of the magisterial 2005 book After Fidel. A 2006 Government Accountability Office study found that those programs are plagued by managerial difficulties and inadequate oversight, but it also noted that Cuban dissidents felt USAID activities "provided moral support and enhanced their ability to continue their pro-democracy work." In a statement on March 24, Obama lamented that "Cuban authorities continue to respond to the aspirations of the Cuban people with a clenched fist." Would scrapping the embargo help spur liberalization? Peter Orr, who served as USAID Cuba coordinator under President Clinton, is doubtful. Foreign investment has been pouring into Cuba since the mid-1990s, as have foreign tourists. Both have strengthened the dictatorship. It is somewhat fanciful to think that still more mojito-sipping sunbathers would catalyze a transformation. Cuban-American family visitors are a different matter. After President Carter relaxed the travel ban in the late 1970s, a surge of Cuban exiles returned to the island and fomented real instability. Could that happen again? The family visitors of 2010 are, on balance, substantially poorer than those who went back during the Carter years, says Latell, and the legal emigration channels opened by the 1994 migration accord function as a population safety valve. But Orr believes that Cuban-American travel is still a huge asset to the island's democracy activists. "So, in effect, the Obama administration's removing restrictions on this travel is the most supportive thing they could have done for the dissident movement in Cuba," he told me in an e-mail last year. The broader U.S. embargo should be used as a tool to incentivize Cuban liberalization. Latell reckons that most senior members of the military and Communist bureaucracy -- including Raúl Castro -- favor Chinese-style economic reforms, though they do not necessarily want Cuba to become what China is today. But Fidel rejects the Deng Xiaoping model, and any large-scale implementation of that model presupposes his death. Latell suspects that if Fidel died and Raúl (who turns 79 on June 3) were still in control as president, Havana would adopt a more pragmatic approach to the United States, and might even be willing to free political prisoners in return for U.S. investment. If America ditched sanctions tomorrow without first obtaining serious concessions, it would be rewarding the Cuban government at a time when that government appears increasingly vulnerable. The embargo may seem a hopeless anachronism. But it could prove a valuable bargaining chip, and it's worth keeping at least a little while longer.

#### The embargo is a key bargaining chip – key to negotiations

Suchlicki 2008

[Jaime, Professor of History and Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban American Studies at the University of Miami, “Interview with Professor Jaime Suchlicki on Cuba and U.S.-Cuban Relations,” http://www6.miami.edu/Iccas/Docs/BBC%20Interview2.pdf]

The status-quo is a statement against a dictatorial regime. Historically we have provided concessions to some countries and achieved little. England provided concessions to Hitler prior to World War II and Hitler did whatever he wanted after those concessions. Concessions have to come at the same time that there are concessions on the other side. If we are going to lift the travel ban, we should request a quid pro quo, if we are going to change the embargo, there should be a quid pro quo unless there is that, then we wait. If we give away now the policy which is the embargo, the travel ban, and so on to the Castro brothers, what do we have to negotiate with in the future? When there is a regime that is willing to change, we would have nothing to offer. I much prefer holding on to the policy in the hope and expectation that down the road, there will be a regime that is willing to provide meaningful concessions and at that point we can provide help, aid, tourists, to help that regime.

## Theory

### A2 Perm Do Both

#### Even with crackdowns, leaks are inevitable

Halliday 2013

[Josh, The Guardian, “Whistleblowers will continue to leak state secrets, warns AP chief”, June 26, http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2013/jun/26/associated-press-chief-whistleblowers]

Intelligence whistleblowers such as Edward Snowden will continue to leak state secrets in the public interest despite being "aggressively pursued" by the Obama administration, the president of Associated Press has said. Gary Pruitt, the head of the global news agency, warned Washington that it cannot control the "inevitable" flow of information to the media in the wake of Snowden's disclosures about classified surveillance programs in the US and UK. He said: "The Obama administration has made it clear that it will aggressively pursue leakers and whistleblowers. I think there will inevitably be leakers and whistleblowers, however, because there are so many people who have access to classified information." Obama's government has "gone after leakers in a way that no other has", Pruitt said, adding that the pursuit of whistleblowers has "become a much bigger issue than I believe they thought it would be". His comments come following the media outcry in the US over the seizure of AP phone records and the threat of criminal prosecution against a Fox News reporter. The US Department of Justice targeted the records of more than 20 phone lines of AP reporters and editors in secret in April and May in an attempt to discover the source of leaked information about a foiled bomb plot in Yemen. Obama has ordered the Department of Justice to review its guidelines on press freedom after major news outlets warned of "government overreach". The attorney general Eric Holder is expected to report back to the president on 12 July. But Pruitt said the incidents had threatened America's record as a "light of free press for the world". He said: "Fortunately, both the president and the attorney general have said they don't plan to prosecute journalists for doing their job. We think that should be the law, the rule, not just something they state.

### A2 Perm Do the Counterplan

#### Perm severs—reject the team, creates a moving target makes debate impossible

#### Conditions must be explicit – otherwise engagement is unconditional

Haass & O’Sullivan 2000

[Richard N. Haass, , VP & Director of Foreign Policy Studies at Brookings and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at Brookings Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies 113, Survival, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 113–35]

Many different types of engagement strategies exist, depending on who is engaged, the kind of incentives employed and the sorts of objectives pursued. Engagement may be conditional when it entails a negotiated series of exchanges, such as where the US extends positive inducements for changes undertaken by the target country. Or engagement may be unconditional if it offers modifications in US policy towards a country without the explicit expectation that a reciprocal act will follow. Generally, conditional engagement is geared towards a government; unconditional engagement works with a country’s civil society or private sector in the hope of promoting forces that will eventually facilitate cooperation.

#### textual competition bad-

#### -causes infinitely regressive word pics, encourages vague plan writing and forces debate to meaningless semantics which gut topic specific education

#### -less real world—policymakers look to the effects of plan—understanding international bargaining has real political consequences

#### -doesn’t solve their offense—neg would just re-write the CP in a way that was textually competitive

#### Resolved means firm

American Heritage 2000

AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE: FOURTH EDITION. 2000. Available from the World Wide Web at: [www.dictionary.com](http://www.dictionary.com), accessed 3/31/06. UMBF

1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To cause (a person) to reach a decision. See synonyms at dec

#### Should requires certainty

Nieto 2009

Judge Henry Nieto, Colorado Court of Appeals, 8-20-2009 People v. Munoz, 240 P.3d 311 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009)

“Should” is “used . . . to express duty, obligation, propriety, or expediency.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2104 (2002). Courts interpreting the word in various contexts have drawn conflicting conclusions, although the weight of authority appears to favor interpreting “should” in an imperative, obligatory sense. A number of courts, confronted with the question of whether using the word “should” in jury instructions conforms with the Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections governing the reasonable doubt standard, have upheld instructions using the word. In the courts of other states in which a defendant has argued that the word “should” in the reasonable doubt instruction does not sufficiently inform the jury that it is bound to find the defendant not guilty if insufficient proof is submitted at trial, the courts have squarely rejected the argument. They reasoned that the word “conveys a sense of duty and obligation and could not be misunderstood by a jury.” See State v. McCloud, 891 P.2d 324, 335 (Kan. 1995); see also Tyson v. State, 457 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding argument that “should” is directional but not instructional to be without merit); Commonwealth v. Hammond, 504 A.2d 940, 941-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). Notably, courts interpreting the word “should” in other types of jury instructions have also found that the word conveys to the jury a sense of duty or obligation and not discretion. In Little v. State, 554 S.W.2d 312, 324 (Ark. 1977), the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted the word “should” in an instruction on circumstantial evidence as synonymous with the word “must” and rejected the defendant’s argument that the jury may have been misled by the court’s use of the word in the instruction. Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a defendant’s argument that the court erred by not using the word “should” in an instruction on witness credibility which used the word “must” because the two words have the same meaning. State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958). In applying a child support statute, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that a legislature’s or commission’s use of the word “should” is meant to convey duty or obligation. McNutt v. McNutt, 49 P.3d 300, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (finding a statute stating that child support expenditures “should” be allocated for the purpose of parents’ federal tax exemption to be mandatory).

### A2 Condition Counterplans Bad

#### Interpretation – we can condition counterplans with a solvency advocate

#### Key to fairness

#### Neg ground—the best neg literature against engaging Cuba says we should use economic engagement as a bargaining chip for internal reforms

Perez 2010

[David A. Yale Law School, JD, Harvard Latino Law Review, Spring, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187, America’s Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, p. 216-7]

After conducting some initial discussions, both countries can then move on to the embargo. No one argues that the embargo is an effective foreign policy, because it has clearly failed to bring about real reform on the island; the only argument for maintaining the embargo is that it can be used as a bargaining chip for more dialogue – not that in its current state it can lead to a better situation. Put differently, the embargo is only valuable to the extent that its removal can be part of a quid pro quo strategy – not that its maintenance will lead to fundamental reform on the island. This reveals a bifurcated myopia that affects both sides of the debate. On the one hand those who support the embargo as a negotiating chip often gloss over the fact that its continuation will not lead to regime change. On the other hand, those who focus on the embargo’s inability to topple the regime and instead support lifting the embargo unconditionally, generally give too little weight to the embargo’s value during diplomatic negotiations. The Helms-Burton legislation lays out the rather onerous conditions that must be met on Cuba’s end before the U.S. can begin restoring diplomatic relations. The significance of Helms-Burton’s restraints cannot be overstated: while a particular president’s rhetoric or a particular resolution’s wording might chill diplomatic relations between two countries, Helms-Burton’s arduous provisions freeze relations. The onus to thaw that freeze is properly placed upon Washington, rather than Havana. It is therefore incumbent upon the United States to change its own laws before any rapprochement with Cuba can begin. Invariably the debate surrounding America’s embargo revolves around its solvency: has it worked? The question should instead be reworded to ask: will current U.S. policy work from here on out to achieve certain definable interests? The United States sold the island over $ 700 million in goods in 2008, accounting for 40% of the island’s agricultural imports. That number seems to indicate that Cuba’s trading relationship with the U.S. is not of trivial importance to the island’s leadership. However, the strength of this relationship may steadily diminish relative to other trading partners in the next few years. For example, over the next five to seven years Cuba will have an increased energy productivity stemming from its coastal drilling operations that will bring it closer to Spain, Canada, Norway, Brazil, and India. With these relatively stable flows of capital, Cuba will increasingly become insulated from U.S. economic pressure. The moment to decisively influence Cuba’s government through economic pressure may have never existed, but if it did, it has surely passed. The notion that the U.S. can intricately craft Cuba’s governmental and domestic policies by applying a combination of economic and political pressure must be rejected either as categorically false, or as an anachronism of the early 1990s. During her confirmation hearings, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said “that it is not time to lift the embargo on Cuba, especially since it provides an important source of leverage for further change on the island.” Secretary Clinton is correct: the embargo definitely provides a valuable bargaining chip during negotiations, and should not be lifted unconditionally. But given this evidence, the Obama Administration should be suspect of claims that the embargo gives the U.S. decisive leverage over Cuba.

#### 2. Reciprocity—the aff can specify implementation—their failure to specify justifies counterplans

#### Key to education – there is a material difference between the plan and the counterplan—analyzing that difference is key to topic specific education

#### Understanding process outweighs –

#### A) understanding minutia is key to effective policy analysis—that’s key to decisonmaking and evaluating opportunity costs

#### B) key to in depth research and clash over the policy implementation literature

#### Understanding process is key to effective political action

Kersin 1994

Cornelius M. Kerwin, Provost, American University, 1994 (Rulemaking: How Government Agencies Write Law and Make Policy) p. preface

Rulemaking is the single most important function performed by agencies of government. Some readers may find this a surprising, if not outrageous, assertion. But consider the breadth and depth of influence that rulemaking has on our lives. Rulemaking refines, and in some instances defines, the mission of every government agency. In so doing it provides direction and content for budgeting, program implementation, procurement, person­nel management, dispute resolution, and other important government activities. Rules provide specific, authoritative statements of the obliga­tions the government has assumed and the benefits it must provide. It is to rules, not statutes or other containers of the law, that we turn most often for an understanding of what is expected of us and what we can expect from government. As a result, intense political activity sur­rounds the contemporary rulemaking process, and effective political action in America is no longer possible without serious attention to rulemaking.

#### Reject the argument not the team

## Net Benefit

### 2NC Democracy

#### Only conditional repeal guarantees democracy – the aff causes a return to state ownership

Sanguinetty 2013

[Jorge A., Democracy, Development, and Institutions, “Who benefits and loses if the US-Cuba embargo is lifted?”, http://devresearchcenter.org/2013/04/08/who-benefits-and-loses-if-the-us-cuba-embargo-is-lifted-by-jorge-a-sanguinetty/]

The answer depends on the conditions under which the embargo is lifted. I focus on the expected distribution of benefits (and costs) between the government and the Cuban population. A unilateral move by the US Government, without any quid pro quo by the Cuban government can be expected to yield significant benefits to the official establishment with benefits of an unknown magnitude to the population at large. I posit that the magnitude of the latter depends on the degree of internal liberalization of the Cuban economy. Until Raul Castro took over, the centralized command of the Cuban economy was subject to a set or constraints arguably more restrictive than the US embargo. What I have called the internal embargo consisted in the Cuban government outright prohibition for Cubans to own enterprises, freely employ workers or trade domestically and internationally. To many Cubans, probably a majority, such constraints were the main cause of the country ´s secular economic crisis. Lifting the US embargo under such circumstances was reasonably expected to yield most of the economic and political benefits to the Cuban government and limited economic and no political benefits to the population. With the recent partial economic (not political) liberalization policies implemented by Raul Castro, we can expect that the distribution of economic benefits would be more favorable to the Cuban people. Such new economic freedoms carry a dose of informal political freedoms as Cubans are able to develop relationships among themselves that were tightly constrained until recently, like freedom of assembly, to communicate, and to make transactions and agreements without the tutelage of the government. To wit, as the private sector develops because the government is forced to reduce the inflated payrolls of its enterprises, the authorities lose control on those newly liberated workers. Nonetheless, the system might have reached a point of equilibrium under which an unconditional lifting of the US embargo might still accrue enough economic benefit to the Cuban government that it leads to a roll back of some recent reforms in order to cut loses in the political, albeit informal, arena. This will be a strong reason to oppose an unconditional lifting on the embargo for those who care about the wishes for freedom and welfare of the Cuban people. Many international observers oppose the US embargo on the basis of several debatable assumptions. One is the belief that the embargo has served the Castro government as an excuse for its economic failures, and once lifted the excuse will disappear. Another assumption is that Cubans don´t know that the embargo might have constrained their economy, but not as much as the restrictions of virtually all economic activity by the Cuban government. There are also many Cubans that believe that the US embargo is the only leverage left to pressure the Cuban government to lift internal restrictions in both the economic and the political fronts. It is doubtful that, under the current conditions, a non-negotiated lifting of the US embargo is likely to bring about democracy in Cuba.

#### Moral side constraint

**Petro** **1974**

[Sylvester, Wake Forest Professor in Toledo Law Review, Spring, page 480]

However, one may still insist, echoing Ernest Hemingway - "I believe in only one thing: liberty." And it is always well to bear in mind David Hume's observation: "**It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once**." Thus, **it is unacceptable to say that the invasion of one aspect of freedom is of no import because there have been invasions of so many other aspects. That road leads to chaos, tyranny, despotism, and the end of all human aspiration**. Ask Solzhenitsyn. Ask Milovan Dijas. In sum, if one believed in freedom as a supreme value and the proper ordering principle for any society aiming to maximize spiritual and material welfare, then **every invasion of freedom must be emphatically identified and resisted with undying spirit**.

### 2NC Refugees

#### Cuba economic stability critical social and political stability – they are the backbone to preventing a mass migration from Cuba, which will spark a refugee crisis – empirically proven

Dr. Timothy Ashby (Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs) March 29 2013 “Preserving Stability in Cuba After Normalizing Relations with the United States – The Importance of Trading with State-Owned Enterprises”, http://www.coha.org/preserving-stability-in-cuba-timothy-ashby/

Cuba under Raúl Castro has entered a new period of economic, social, and political transformation. Reforms instituted within the past few years have brought the expansion of private sector entrepreneurial activity, including lifting restrictions on the sales of residential real estate, automobiles, and electronic goods. Additional reforms included, more than a million hectares of idle land has been leased to private farmers, where citizens have been granted permission to stay in hotels previously reserved for tourists, and freedom being granted for most Cubans to travel abroad. Stating that it was time for the “gradual transfer” of “key roles to new generations,” President Raúl Castro announced that he will retire by 2018, and named as his possible successor a man who was not even born at the time of the Cuban Revolution. [1]¶ The twilight of the Castro era presents challenges and opportunities for U.S. policy makers. Normalization of relations is inevitable, regardless of timing, yet external and internal factors may accelerate or retard the process. The death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez is likely to undermine the already dysfunctional Cuban economy, if it leads to reductions in oil imports and other forms of aid. This could bring social chaos, especially among the island’s disaffected youth. Such an outcome would generate adverse consequences for U.S. national and regional security. To maintain Cuba’s social and economic stability while reforms are maturing, the United States must throw itself open to unrestricted bilateral trade with all Cuban enterprises, both private and state-owned.¶ The collapse of Cuba’s tottering economy could seismically impact the United States and neighboring countries. It certainly did during the Mariel Boatlift of 1980, precipitated by a downturn in the Cuban economy which led to tensions on the island. Over 125,000 Cuban refugees landed in the Miami area, including 31,000 criminals and mental patients. Today, the United States defines its national security interests regarding Cuba as follows:¶ • Avoid one or more mass migrations;¶ • Prevent Cuba from becoming another porous border that allows continuous large-scale migration to the hemisphere;¶ • Prevent Cuba from becoming a major source or transshipment point for the illegal drug trade;¶ • Avoid Cuba becoming a state with ungoverned spaces that could provide a platform for terrorists and others wishing to harm the United States. [2]¶ All of these national security threats are directly related to economic and social conditions within Cuba.¶ U.S. policy specifically supports “a market-oriented economic system” [3] toward Cuba, yet regulations prohibit the importation of any goods of Cuban origin, whether from the island’s potentially booming private sector–including 300,000 agricultural producers–or State-Owned Enterprises (“SOEs”). [4] Such a policy is counterproductive to U.S. interests. Regardless of over 400,000 entrepreneurs, including agricultural cultivators, it could be many years, if ever, when Cuba’s private sector would be ready to serve as the engine of economic growth. SOEs employ 72 percent of Cuban workers. [5] A rational commercial rapprochement towards Cuba would therefore require a change in current laws and in the system of regulations prohibiting the importation of Cuban goods and products. Normalized bilateral trade will benefit the Cuban people by helping to provide economic stability and fostering the growth of a middle class–both of which are essential for the foundation of democratic institutions. Two-way trade must include both Cuba’s private sector as well as SOEs.¶ Cuban SOEs are in a state of gradual transition like other parts of the economy. In December 2012, the Cuban government authorized a wide range of co-ops that will allow workers to collectively open new businesses or take over existing SOEs in construction, transportation, and other industries. Considered a pilot program that is a prime candidate for an expansion, the co-ops “will not be administratively subordinated to any state entity.” [6] Many Cuban officials, well aware of the limits to small-scale entrepreneurism, appear to harbor hope that co-ops could shift a large portion of the island’s economy to free-market competition from government-managed socialism. In other transitional states, particularly in post-socialist economies, co-ops have served as commercial bridges between state-owned and privatized business. Of the 300 largest co-ops in the world, more than half are in United States, Italy, or France. [7]¶ Ironically, the outputs of such co-ops, including agricultural products which could find strong demand in the American market, are barred by short-sighted federal regulations, thus hampering, if not defeating, what could be a major U.S. policy goal.¶ The United States has been actively trading with foreign SOEs for years. China, a one party, communist state, is the United States’s second largest trading partner, and Chinese SOE’s account for a large percentage of the nearly $400 billion USD in goods exported to America each year. Venezuela is in the top fifteen of U.S. trading partners, and the bulk of that country’s exports are petroleum products deriving from the state-owned PDVSA (which in turn owns Houston-based CITCO oil company). Another communist country, Vietnam–which initially was the subject of a U.S. economic embargo similar to that imposed on Cuba–is the second largest source of U.S. clothing imports and a major manufacturing source for footwear, furniture, and electrical machinery. [8] On these matters, the Cuban government has said that it wants to “replicate the paths of Vietnam and China.” [9]¶ Of relevance to Cuban trade relations, Vietnam has formally requested to be added to the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program as a “beneficiary developing country,” which authorizes the U.S. president to grant duty-free treatment for eligible products. The statute also provides the President with specific political and economic criteria to use, when designating eligible countries and products. “Communist” countries are not eligible for GSP membership unless the president determines that certain conditions have been met, including whether the applicant is “dominated or controlled by international communism.” Furthermore, countries that fail to recognize “internationally accepted workers’ rights” are excluded. [10]¶ U.S. statutes do not provide a general definition of a “communist” country, and the Obama administration is expected to declare that Vietnam is no longer “communist” in terms of its economic system. The argument will be that even if Vietnam is a “communist” country (hard to deny, considering it has one party government that is officially titled the Communist Party of Vietnam), it is “not dominated or controlled by international communism” because no such entity exists following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Similar arguments may be applied to Cuba in considering normalized relations with the United States.¶ At the request of the U.S. Congress, the General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted detailed reviews of the frameworks for seven key statutes that govern Cuban sanctions. [11] The resulting reports concluded that (i) the president still maintains “broad discretion” to make additional modifications to Cuban sanctions; and (ii) prior measures, implemented by the executive branch have had the effect of easing specific restrictions of the Cuba sanctions and have been consistent with statutory mandates as well as within the discretionary authority of the president. [12] Some legal scholars assert that absence of such explicit statutory provisions in other areas suggests that Congress did not intend to prohibit the executive branch from issuing general or specific licenses to authorize certain transactions with Cuba when “such licenses are deemed to be appropriate and consistent with U.S. policies.” [13]¶ Although a complex variety of federal statutes have re-stated the regulatory prohibition on importation of Cuban goods under 31 C.F.R. § 515.204, enabling legislation to codify the restriction, has not been passed. For example, 22 U.S.C. § 6040(a) “notes” that 31 C.F.R. § 515.204 prohibits the importation of goods from Cuba, but does not codify or expressly prohibit such activity, and 22 U.S.C. § 7028 acknowledges that Congress did not attempt to alter any prohibitions on the importation of goods from Cuba under 31 C.F.R. § 515.204. [14]¶ The complete dismantling of the Cuban economic embargo will undoubtedly require congressional legislation; however, the president has broad powers to modify policy towards Cuba, particularly in an emergency situation that could affect U.S. national security. [15] For example, imports of Cuban origin goods are prohibited under the Cuban Asset Control Regulations (“CACRS”) except as “specifically authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury by means of regulations, rulings, instructions, licenses or otherwise.” [16]¶ Such authority could allow the president to argue for the modification of 31 C.F.R. § 204’s complete prohibition on the importation of Cuban goods by stating that Cuban exports to the United States help the Cuban people by creating employment and thereby maintaining the island’s social stability. Considering the domestic political constituency and the political obduracy of U.S. Congress, a more realistic presidential rationale for allowing Cuban imports from all types of enterprises could be the protection of U.S. borders during an era of grave concerns about homeland security.¶ Some policy analysts suggest that bilateral trade with Cuba should be restricted to businesses and individuals engaged in certifiably independent (i.e. non-state) economic activity. [17] While well-intentioned, such a policy would likely have a negligible impact on Cuba’s economic development and fails to recognize that commercial enterprises that the U.S. government would classify as SOEs are actually co-ops or other types of quasi-independent entities that are in the early stages of privatization. Restrictions such as this also fail to address larger national and regional security concerns which are the primary responsibility of the president.¶ Although ultimately the Cuban people must freely choose their own political and economic systems, President Obama should be seen as having legal authority to support the transition taking place on the island by opening U.S. markets to Cuban imports. Normalized bilateral trade will benefit the Cuban people and help to provide economic and social stability that is in turn vital to U.S. national and regional security.

#### Refugee crises divert Coast Guard resources---they gut mission effectiveness

Margaret D. Stock (Associate Professor, Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York and Lieutenant Colonel, Military Police Corps, United States Army Reserve) 2001, “National Security and Immigration Policy: Reclaiming Terms, Measuring Success, and Setting Priorities” http://www.aclu.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20111110/ACLURM002826.pdf

7 Fed. Reg. 68924 (Nov. 13, 2002) (“A surge in illegal migration by sea threatens national security by diverting valuable United States Coast Guard and other resources from counter-terrorism ...”); In re D-J-, 23 I & N Dec. 572 (A.G. 2003) (“[T]here is a substantial prospect that the release of such aliens .... [would] encourage future surges in illegal migration by sea ... diverting valuable Coast Guard and DOJ resources **from counterterrorism and** homeland security responsibilities.”)

#### Coast Guard capabilities are key to naval power projection

Scott Decker (LT CMNDER USCG) Feb 2001 The coast guard is capable of conducting and leading expeditionary harbor defense/port security and Harbor approach defense operations, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA389731

.. .From the Sea touches on this, identifying sealift as a key enabler for joint operations and identifying the potential for Coast Guard involvement. Protection of our sealift assets is vital to our success as "sea lines of communication carry more than 95 percent of the logistic support for forward-deployed forces.. .Although vessels are vulnerable throughout their voyage, that vulnerability is greatest in the transition area between "blue water" (deep oceans and seas) and "brown water" (coastal regions) and at [the] points of origin and destination."6 This transition area is the Coast Guard's backyard: its units play there everyday**.** As America elected to spend the Cold War peace-dividend at home, the Navy sought to increase efficiencies and maximize the use of declining defense funds by improving the multi-mission capabilities of its high-end combatants. As less capable ships are being decommissioned to save money, the Navy is losing the flexibility it professes is necessary for future success. In essence it is finding itself between the "rocks" of limited defense dollars and the uncharted "shoals" of asymmetric warfare. Fewer combatants, although highly capable, equate to less forward presence and a net loss when conflict ensues. "If you lose a multi-mission platform, the impact on your overall warfighting capability [is more significant] with the remainder of the force."7 Then CNO ADM Jay Johnson correctly identified the situation in late summer 1999 and recommended a way out: "the Navy must consider increasing the size of its fleet to further diminish the threat of an attack along a coast.. .Simply put, numbers do matter."8 While defense spending is likely to rise with the pro-defense Bush administration, it will likely not be enough to support both a significant increase in the number of combatants and the development of a theater missile defense system. The "rocks and shoals" will still exist. Admiral James Loy, the Coast Guard's current Commandant recently observed, "In the [Cold War] era of a 600-ship Navy, 40 or so Coast Guard cutters were a virtual afterthought. But today with regional instability and strife around the world and 116 surface combatants in the Navy, [our 41major] cutters along with several hundred coastal patrol boats take on a new significance."9 This statement demonstrates that Coast Guard resources can help fulfill the low-end role. The CINCs have identified these deficiencies as well and are seeking ways to fill the gaps. A 1992 research study on 21s1 century Coast Guard roles and missions asked them the following: "What specialized service could the CG perform for DOD in the next century, and is there a gap in DOD capabilities that the Coast Guard could fill?" The responses ranged from consolidating the Navy's naval control of the shipping mission into the MDZ [maritime defense zone] command structure to assuming responsibilities for "the low end of the high-low mix of ships." Additional responses addressed providing capabilities for which the Navy does not have sufficient resources, and presence in low threat areas.10 Seven years later, the Joint Interagency Task Force on Roles and Missions of the United States Coast Guard [hereafter referred to as' Interagency Task Force'], established by then-President Clinton to "provide advice and recommendations regarding the appropriate roles and missions for the United States Coast Guard through the year 2020,"11 validated this continuing need for Coast Guard involvement, and concluded, "The National Security Strategy and the conclusions of the Quadrennial Defense Review require forces capable of fighting and winning two nearly simultaneous Major Theater Wars. To effect that strategy, the war-fighting Commanders-in-Chief have incorporated and depend upon Coast Guard assets for their war plans."12 In summation, the CINCs are depending on Coast Guard forces—as key partners in the larger joint USN/USCG harbor defense/port security organization currently in place-to fulfill the vision in Forward...From the Sea that"... U.S. naval forces will assume critical roles in the protection of vital sealift along the strategic lines of approach to the theater of conflict, including the air- and sea-ports of debarkation."13 The Coast Guard is ready to respond: permitting the U.S. to project a "seamless" joint force, filling a critical role in protecting U.S power projection capabilities, and freeing up additional combatants for offensive use.

#### Naval power independently solves great power war

James T. Conway (General, U.S. Marine Corps, Gary Roughead, Admiral, U.S. Navy, Thad W. Allen, Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard) 2007 “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” October, http://www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf

No other disruption is as potentially disastrous to global stability as war among major powers. Maintenance and extension of this Nation’s comparative seapower advantage is a key component of deterring major power war. While war with another great power strikes many as improbable, the near-certainty of its ruinous effects demands that it be actively deterred using all elements of national power. The expeditionary character of maritime forces—our lethality, global reach, speed, endurance, ability to overcome barriers to access, and operational agility—provide the joint commander with a range of deterrent options. We will pursue an approach to deterrence that includes a credible and scalable ability to retaliate against aggressors conventionally, unconventionally, and with nuclear forces. Win our Nation’s wars. In times of war, our ability to impose local sea control, overcome challenges to access, force entry, and project and sustain power ashore, makes our maritime forces an indispensable element of the joint or combined force. This expeditionary advantage must be maintained because it provides joint and combined force commanders with freedom of maneuver. Reinforced by a robust sealift capability that can concentrate and sustain forces, sea control and power projection enable extended campaigns ashore.

### FDI Solves Growth

#### Foreign investment key to growth

Arlidge 2013

[John, The Sunday Times, “Viva la revolucion: Cuba turns capitalist; Raul Castro, Fidel's brother, hopes that a liberalised private sector will prevent economic collapse, writes John Arlidge”, May 5, Lexis]

Under Raul Castro's reforms, entrepreneurs can not only set up businesses and advertise for the first time, they can travel abroad freely. Many visit relatives in Miami and Spain to seek funding for start-ups. America, whose trade embargo is blamed for so many of Cuba's woes, is helping to channel funds to the new marketistas. President Barack Obama recently relaxed restrictions on Cuban-Americans sending money to relatives back home. Up to $2.3bn a year comes in over the counter through Western Union, and maybe half as much again under the counter, smuggled in on the 60 new charter flights that operate from leading American cities to Havana every week. It is, of course, early days. Most businesses are small, employing only a handful of people, often family members. More than 85% of GDP remains in the hands of the state and the government seems unlikely to meet its aim of reducing that figure to 60% by 2015. What would really make a difference is large-scale foreign investment - a key element in the rapid growth of other new "market socialist" states such as China and Vietnam. But here the signs are mixed, at best. Brazilian firms are building a vast $1bn deep water port and container terminal at Mariel, near Havana, to be operated by a Singaporean company. Around it will be Cuba's first business development zone. But until - and if - the American trade embargo eases, it is not clear how busy it will be. Overall, the number of joint ventures between overseas investors and the Cuban government fell last year to 240, compared with 258 in 2009. Unilever, the Anglo-Dutch consumer giant, recently pulled out after failing to resolve a dispute over the controlling interest in a new joint venture. Telecom Italia followed. Nestlé, Sol Melia hotels, Imperial Tobacco and Pernod Ricard, which makes Havana Club rum, soldier on. One area of hope is tourism. Tourist numbers are rising, in spite of the global recession. A record 3m visitors arrived last year, including, for the first time in years, many Americans. Obama has relaxed restrictions on tourism, allowing "people to people" cultural exchanges. Half the guests at the Saratoga, Havana's best hotel, are American. The rapper Jay-Z and his wife, Beyoncé Knowles, were there last month. Tourism generates about $3bn a year. With new investment, that figure could easily double, making tourism Cuba's biggest employer and its largest foreign exchange earner after nickel mining. "Cuba is the top emerging tourism market in the Caribbean by a mile and it's in the top five emerging markets globally," said Andrew Macdonald, a Scots-born local entrepreneur. He wants to cash in by creating Cuba's first purpose-built 500-acre golf resort, with 800 homes, at Carbonera, near the beach resort of Varadero. Macdonald's firm, Esencia, has hired big names to design the $350m project, including Sir Terence Conran; Adrian Zecha, founder of Aman resorts; and the golfer Tony Jacklin. But, in spite of seven years of negotiation and $3m spent on feasibility studies, Macdonald still does not have official approval to start work. "It's a long slog," he said. For now, ministers and middle-ranking bureaucrats, who have most to lose from a radical economic shake-up, seem to want to take things slow. One western diplomat who attended the May Day celebrations last week summed up Raul Castro's problem thus: "He knows communism has failed and Cuba is a declining economy in a rising Latin America. But how can he introduce significant market reforms and generate growth without calling into question the 'glorious revolution'?" On the streets of Havana, that's the 64,000-peso question.

#### Current economic reforms fail – only foreign direct investment solves

Tamayo and Whitefield 2013

[Juan and Mimi, Miami Herald, “Cuba still searching for economic model that works”, http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/08/02/v-fullstory/2928266/cuba-still-searching-for-economic.html]

Cuba faces a difficult economic situation despite Raúl Castro’s reforms, and a military-led economic transition appears more likely than a Vietnamese or Chinese model of change, Cuba analysts said Thursday. “The reforms haven’t provided results. There are too many limitations … there’s an enormous stagnation in society,” said dissident Havana economist Oscar Espinosa Chepe in a speech recorded for the opening session of the annual meeting of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy. Some 100 economists, social scientists, and other Cuba experts gathered at The Hilton Miami Downtown hotel to present their work on the policy challenges facing Cuba. This year’s topic: Where is Cuba going? Cuba’s situation is “very delicate and difficult,” Chepe said. Among the problems he cited in Cuba’s plan to move massive numbers of state employees into self-employment is the lack of materials they need to run their businesses and the competition this creates with the rest of the population trying to make purchases for daily living. Joaquin Pujol, a retired International Monetary Fund economist, said that very few of the people who have joined the ranks of the self-employed were really working for the government before. Most, he said, were unemployed, already working for themselves under the table, were retired or are students. Vegard Bye, a Cuba expert at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, said Vietnam more than China is a model for the Castro government as it pushes toward a more market-oriented economy, although Cuba is unique in many ways. “Cuba is different from everybody,” he said, adding that it will be difficult for island leaders to copy anyone else’s economic model during a transition. Cuba, for example, hasn’t done as well as China or Vietnam in recruiting new generations of leaders and managers, Bye said, and as it reforms the economy, it is less likely to be able to maintain political controls as easily as Vietnam has done. Bye noted that the thrust of Castro’s recent visit to China, Vietnam and Russia seems to be an effort to figure out how a market economy can be implemented and institutionalized without losing political control. He said that the Cuban military and former military officers who have had vast experience in managing a large majority of the island’s state-owned enterprises are likely to have a strong voice in the island’s economic future. Cuba, Bye said, essentially faces two scenarios: a Vietnam-like shift toward a more market-oriented economy with space for small- and medium-sized private businesses but with the government clearly in political control or the perhaps more likely “authoritarian militarized transition” in which military technocrats take control through cronyism and corruption. “I hope for No. 1, but the tendency is very much toward the second one,” Bye noted. He pointed out that in the economic transitions in Russia and Eastern Europe, three-quarters of the current economic leaders were previous party leaders during the Communist regime. In Russia particularly, he said, the old party chiefs became the owners of formerly public property, while in the other countries the trend has been for them to form the new managerial class. In Cuba there is a “strong tradition for small-scale capitalism,” said Pujol. But he said, “There is no way the Cuban economy can recover without strong foreign investment.” Several analysts said they thought Cuban membership in international financial institutions could aid in its transition. “Cuba needs foreign direct investment” and membership in international financial institutions “is vital for Cuba eventually,” said Richard Feinberg, a professor of international political economy at the University of California, San Diego. Feinberg has laid out a strategy for Cuba’s reconnection with international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. “Membership [in the IMF] does not require you be a liberal democracy,” he said. “A lot of strange governments and rogue governments are in the IMF and the World Bank.” But one big problem is that a country must express a desire to join the IMF, and at this point Cuba, which left the fund in 1964, hasn’t shown interest in applying, said Lorenzo Perez, who retired from the IMF after a 30-year career. Cuba would also need a sponsor. Countries such as Brazil and China that are friendly with Cuba might be willing to fulfill the role, he said, although at this point they might have to bring Cuba “kicking and screaming into the IMF.” While IMF membership wouldn’t immediately promote democracy in Cuba, Perez said it could promote political reform in the longer term by forcing Cuba to adopt a more rational economy policy and by encouraging policy transparency and government accountability

### A2 Reform Now

#### Current reforms are just lip-service. Substantial restrictions remain

Suchlicki 2013

[Jaime, Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor and Director, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami, “What If…the U.S. Ended the Cuba Travel Ban and the Embargo?”, February 26, http://interamericansecuritywatch.com/what-if-the-u-s-ended-the-cuba-travel-ban-and-the-embargo/]

In Cuba, foreign investors cannot partner with private Cuban citizens. They can only invest in the island through minority joint ventures with the government and its state enterprises. The dominant enterprise in the Cuban economy is the Grupo GAESA, controlled by the Cuban military. Most investments are done through or with GAESA. Therefore, American companies willing to invest in Cuba will have to partner mostly with the Cuban military. Cuba ranks 176 out of 177 countries in the world in terms of economic freedom. Outshined only by North Korea. It ranks as one of the most unattractive investments next to Iran, Zimbabwe, Libya, Mali, etc. Foreign investors cannot hire, fire, or pay workers directly. They must go through the Cuban government employment agency which selects the workers. Investors pay the government in dollars or euros and the government pays the workers a meager 10% in Cuban pesos. Corruption is pervasive, undermining equity and respect for the rule of law. Cuba does not have an independent/transparent legal system. All judges are appointed by the State and all lawyers are licensed by the State. In the last few years, European investors have had over $1 billion arbitrarily frozen by the government and several investments have been confiscated. Cuba’s Law 77 allows the State to expropriate foreign-invested assets for reason of “public utility” or “social interest.” In the last year, the CEOs of three companies with extensive dealings with the Cuban government were arrested without charges. (1)

#### Err neg – Cuba optimists overestimate the openness of reforms

Cardenas 2013

[Jose, InterAmerican Security Watch, “Cuba Experts” on the Wrong Side of History”, January 22, http://interamericansecuritywatch.com/cuba-experts-on-the-wrong-side-of-history/]

Which brings us to today’s “Cuba experts” — familiar names routinely quoted in the national media whose analyses amount to uncanny regurgitations of those of the disgraced Sovietologists. They too do not question the legitimacy y or stability of the Castro regime; evince little skepticism over regime policies or actions; exaggerate both its accomplishments and its popularity; dismiss the relevance of Cuban dissidents; and maintain that whatever U.S.-Cuba divisions exist are far outweighed by common interests — and that if not for irrational “hardliners” on both sides, then the two countries could get about normalizing relations. And, just like the Sovietologists of old when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power, they accept at face value the reformability of the system. In fact, their most consistent meme today is attempting to convince observers that Raul Castro is ushering in a new Cuban dawn of meaningful economic and political liberalization — and that, as usual, the U.S. is behind the curve. For example, Cuba expert Julia Sweig of the Council on Foreign Relations, tells us, “[Raul] is taking a number of steps that imply a major rewriting of the social contract in Cuba to shrink the size of the state and give Cuban individuals more freedom – economically, especially, but also in terms of speech – than we’ve seen in the last fifty years.” Another of the mainstream media’s go-to experts, Phil Peters of the Lexington Institute, whose obsequious blog reports to the world every pronouncement of Cuban state media, “Cuba is changing, and an economic overhaul is underway. …The changes are important, far more consequential than the liberalizations that helped Cuba’s economy survive the loss of Soviet bloc aid and trade two decades ago.” The new kid on the block, Arturo Lopez-Levy, is a former “intelligence analyst” with Cuba’s repressive Interior Ministry who is now living in the U.S. and studying at the University of Denver. Curiously, he can’t seem to offer a single negative comment about his former employer, and instead is aspiring to be a star media critic of U.S. policy towards Cuba. He writes, “Raul Castro’s commitment to economic reforms and institutionalization is opening venues for the discussion of new ideas within the power structure and the general political discourse. Propositions in favor of a gradual expansion of the role of the market in the economy, the diversification of the property structure, and the expansion of the role of law and rules in the functioning of the government and the party are openly discussed.” It is as if the Berlin Wall never fell. In short, these Cuba experts propagate a make-believe image of Cuba that is utterly unconnected and irrelevant to the way the vast majority of Cubans live their lives. It is a Potemkin Village, in which real Cuban citizens, to the extent they are acknowledged, are expected to be content with their meager rights and opportunities — so meager that no decent person would ever accept them for anyone else living in any civilized society. The reality is Raul Castro’s tepid economic reforms have fundamentally changed nothing in Cuba, as even the New York Times and the Economist have recently reported. That’s because what motivates the regime is not improving the welfare of the Cuban people — there’s a fifty-year record on that — but maintaining absolute control. They understand, as Gorbachev soon did (even if the Cuba experts still do not), that real reform carries real risks to their power and they are too afraid of the legitimate aspirations of the Cuban people for something better to ever allow it. As for any improvement in the rights of the Cuban people, international human rights organizations continue to report on mass detentions of dissidents and absolutely no letup in repression. Indeed, the salient question in Cuba today is less about the prospects for reform, than it is about what impact the loss of billions in annual Venezuelan assistance will have on its mendicant economy if Hugo Chávez succumbs to cancer.

### Net Benefit – Rogues DA

#### Unconditional repeal makes the US look weak – have to leverage our strength

Suchlicki 2010

[Jamie, Professor of History and Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban American Studies at the University of Miami, “American Tourists Won't Bring Democracy to Cuba”, Targeted News Service, Lexis]

Lifting the travel ban without major concessions from Cuba would send the wrong message "to the enemies of the United States": that a foreign leader can seize U.S. properties without compensation; allow the use of his territory for the introduction of nuclear missiles aimed at the United Sates; espouse terrorism and anti-U.S. causes throughout the world; and eventually the United States will "forget and forgive," and reward him with tourism, investments and economic aid. Since the Ford/Carter era, U.S. policy toward Latin America has emphasized democracy, human rights and constitutional government. Under President Reagan the U.S. intervened in Grenada, under President Bush, Sr. the U.S. intervened in Panama and under President Clinton the U.S. landed marines in Haiti, all to restore democracy to those countries. The U.S. has prevented military coups in the region and supported the will of the people in free elections. While this U.S. policy has not been uniformly applied throughout the world, it is U.S. policy in the region. Cuba is part of Latin America. A normalization of relations with a military dictatorship in Cuba will send the wrong message to the rest of the continent. Ending the travel ban and the embargo unilaterally does not guarantee that the Castro brothers will change their hostile policies against the U.S. or provide more freedoms and respect for human rights to the Cuban people. After a U.S. policy change, the Cubans will demand reparations for the embargo, some $60 billion. If we pay that amount, they will then want reparations for the Spanish-American War of 1898 and for U.S. intervention in Cuba. And then.... Supporting regimes and dictators that violate human rights and abuse their population is an ill-advised policy that rewards and encourages further abuses. A large influx of American tourists into Cuba would have a dislocating effect on the economies of smaller Caribbean islands such as Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, the Bahamas, Puerto Rico, and even Florida, highly dependent on tourism for their well being. Careful planning must take place, lest we create significant hardships and social problems in these countries. Since tourism would become a two-way affair, with Cubans visiting the United States in great numbers, it is likely that many would stay in the United States as illegal immigrants, complicating another thorny issue in American domestic politics. If the travel ban is lifted without preconditions, Americans and Cuban-Americans could take their small boats from Florida and visit the island. Thousands of boats would be returning to Florida after visiting Cuba with illegal Cuban migrants, complicating security and migration issues in South Florida. If the travel ban is lifted unilaterally now by the U.S., what will the U.S. government have to negotiate with a future regime in Cuba and to encourage changes in the island? Lifting the ban could be an important bargaining chip with a future regime willing to provide concessions in the area of political and economic freedoms. The travel ban and the embargo should be lifted as a result of negotiations between the U.S. and a Cuban government willing to provide meaningful and irreversible political and economic concessions or when there is a democratic government in place in the island.

## Aff

### Perm Do Both – A2 Leaks

#### No leaks – current crackdown has a chilling effect

Mitchell 2013

[Greg, The Nation, “Obama's War on Leaks: Already Having 'Chilling Effect' on the Media?”, May 22, http://www.thenation.com/blog/174477/obamas-war-leaks-already-having-chilling-effect-media#axzz2Y5pXMEiQ]

It’s been slowly building for quite some time, but now the mainstream media is finally flashing a Red Alert concerning the Obama administration’s anit-leaks campaign. They used to refer to it as simply a “war on whistleblowers.” Now, after the Associated Press and Rosen/Fox News probes, they see it as a “war on the press”—with consequences already quite apparent. Consider just the following: A New York Times editorial today declared, “The Obama administration has moved beyond protecting government secrets to threatening fundamental freedoms of the press to gather news.” It concluded: “Obama administration officials often talk about the balance between protecting secrets and protecting the constitutional rights of a free press. Accusing a reporter of being a ‘co-conspirator,’ on top of other zealous and secretive investigations, shows a heavy tilt toward secrecy and insufficient concern about a free press.” Bruce Brown, executive director of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, added on Tuesday that going after “routine news-gathering efforts as evidence of criminality is extremely troubling and corrodes time-honored understandings between the public and the government about the role of the free press.” And Greg Sargent at The Washington Post interviews Mark Mazzetti, one of the chief Times investigative reporters, who tells him, “There’s no question that this has a chilling effect. People who have talked in the past are less willing to talk now. Everyone is worried about communication and how to communicate, and [asking if there] is there any method of communication that is not being monitored. It’s got people on both sides—the reporter and source side—pretty concerned… “It certainly seems like they’re being very serious about hunting down people talking to reporters. All we know are the results. The fact that you have so many [cases] now, it scares people who talk to us. [Sources] who might have talked to us once may not talk to us now… Those of us doing national security reporting feel it’s a very difficult climate to work in right now.”

### Conditions Bad – Relations

#### Conditional engagement can’t solve relations – authentic concessions key

Birns and Raveendran 2010

[Larry, Director of the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, and Manasi, Research Associate, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, “RESPONSE TO WASHINGTON POST EDITORIAL, "CUBA'S GESTURE", July 16, Lexis]

Unfortunately, the relationship between the United States and Cuba has been poisoned by a formula of toxic quid pro quo initiatives exchanged between Washington and Havana ever since the U.S. embargo first went into effect in October 1960. President Obama's shallow linkage of any major lifting of current U.S. anti-Cuban sanctions with significant political concessions by Havana is neither "wise" nor therapeutic, but the same tired catalogue of specious reasoning and shabby Miami-aimed and electorally-driven political opportunism. Representative of this pitiable art form can be consistently found on the editorial page (as distinguished from its admirable news columns) of the Washington Post. The unremitting trashing of Havana is no way to field a winning ball team or to conduct a mature foreign policy. The chief lobber on hemispheric affairs is Jackson Diehl, whose benighted rants against Castro's Cuba bring with them no lucid end-games but only mean-spirited, ultra-formulaic arm twisting and petty tormenting. These have nothing to do with honorable diplomacy aimed at resolving conflicts before they dangerously worsen. Shame on Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and her non-productive Latin American team on serving the nation refried Bush-era regional policy. Adopting a more flexible and constructive ad hoc approach toward Cuba-such as that reflected by H.R. 4645-would make so much more sense than the continuation of the Post's and the Obama administration's monochromatic posturing. The Chairman of the House Agricultural Committee, Collin C. Peterson (D-MN) commented on the issue in a most intelligent manner when he said: "We have tried to isolate Cuba for more than fifty years, and it has not worked. As it has in other countries, perhaps increasing trade with Cuba will encourage democratic progress." Rather than brandishing the rancid thesis of damning every act by the Cuban government with a pinch of pepper moistened by brine, Washington would do well by taking the Cuban authorities at face value and, armed with cautious optimism, accept Cuba's possibly-earnest gestures and, at least for a while, take them to heart.

### Say No – Embargo

#### Cuba will say no – they don’t care about the embargo

Vivanco 2009

[Jose Miguel, Human Rights Watch, “Obama’s Cuba Policy”, CTV NEWSNET Television, Inc, Lexis]

VIVANCO: Not really. If the Obama administration tries that type of policy, quid pro quo, in other words expecting that the Cuban government will take some steps, let's say that they will release the 250 political prisoners in Cuba today, I don't think we will see any change. The Cuban governments prefer the status quo, in other words that nothing changes. They're not really doing, they're not against specifically the embargo as long as the rest of the world is ready to do business with them. So what Washington should do is to look at Ottawa, and to go to Latin America, and to try to persuade Canada and the rest of the world to build up again a multilateral approach, something that again is not going to be sanctions, it's not going to be normal relations with a government that engages in systemic abuses as a matter of a state policy. But it will be something in the middle like, for instance, develop labour rights in Cuba. There are no labour rights in Cuba. There are some labour benefits. But unions are not able to organize themselves and to collectively bargaining and to, you know, declare a strike. They're at the mercy of the government of Cuba.

#### Cuba will say no – they don’t want to engage the US

Starr 2013

[Pamela K., Director, US-Mexico Network & Associate Professor of International Relations, USC, “As Cuba Changes, U.S. Policy Does Not”, https://www.pacificcouncil.org/document.doc?id=539]

Obstacles to improved bilateral relations, however, are not limited to the U.S. side of the Florida Straits. Our meetings suggested at least three reasons why, despite all their public protestations, the Cuban government may not place an end to the “blockade” at the top of their to-do list: the impact of history; the profound asymmetry of power between the two nations; and the utility of U.S. hostility in unifying the nation against threats to the survival of the Revolution. The history of U.S.-Cuban relations has taught Cuba to be very wary of the United States. Over a half century of hostility has taught each side to mistrust the other, but Cuban suspicion of the United States runs deeper. In part, this is because U.S. policy toward Cuba since 1961 has been geared toward removing the Cuban government from power, and in part it is because of U.S.-Cuban relations even before the Cuban Revolution. From the Cuban perspective, Cuba did not win its independence in 1898, as Americans learn in their history books, but in 1959 as a result of the Revolution. The U.S. goal in the first Cuban War of Independence (what we in the United States call the Spanish-American War) was the separation of Cuba from Spanish colonial domination, followed by its transformation into a de facto colony of the United States. Our Cuban hosts reminded us that the U.S.-imposed Platt Amendment to the Cuban constitution gave the United States the authority to intervene in Cuban politics virtually at will. Furthermore, bilateral economic accords allowed U.S. capital to dominate the production and refining of Cuba’s primary export product, sugar. In the words of Miguel Figueras, “Cuba remained a sugar colony, just of the United States instead of Spain.” Despite the abrogation of the Platt Amendment in 1933, the United States continued to dominate Cuban politics and economy for another quarter century. As a result, the deep poverty, inequality, corruption and repression that characterized Cuba for most of the early 20th century, and which seemed to reach their apogee in the 1950s, has come to be associated with U.S. domination of Cuba. For the delegation, it was not relevant whether or not this was a true reflection of historic fact. What was relevant is that this is how the history of our bilateral relationship is seen from the Cuban perspective and that this understanding of the past informs Cuban engagement with the United States today. Despite evident Cuban fondness for many aspects of American culture (baseball in particular stands out) and their openness to Americans who visit the island, Cubans have no desire to return to their pre-revolutionary past. And given the realities of geography and power, there seems to be a festering undercurrent of concern among Cubans that an uncontrolled opening to the United States could do just this. Indeed, several of our hosts reminded us of the historic U.S. interest, expressed by U.S. politicians from the early 19th century onward, to dominate Cuba and the parallel belief that geography made this both natural and inevitable. This understanding of the history of U.S.-Cuban relations, reinforced by the power asymmetry between our two countries, was clearly reflected in Ambassador Alzugaray’s insistence that Cuba has to be very careful in its dealings with the United States. He argued that this was because “a mistake could prove fatal for Cuba.” He further observed that the United States and Cuba have “never had normal relations” as sovereign equals, so how could we go about constructing them now? The consequence of these apprehensions appears to be an unstated policy of keeping the United States at arm’s length for now. When asked directly what the United States could do to convince Cuba of the sincerity of its desire to improve bilateral relations, the recently retired chief economist for the Ministry of Economy and Planning suggested a series of small confidence-building measures. Ambassador Alzugaray, however, insisted that small steps were not enough. Since the United States is the bigger country, it “needs to make a bigger effort.” The Cuban motivation to prevent a rapid warming in U.S.-Cuban relations also seems to reflect the regime’s historic use of U.S. hostility to unite the country against threats to the Revolution. All of the Cuban academics and former government officials with whom we spoke agreed that the economic and political “updating” of the Cuban system was as essential to the survival of Cuban socialism and its governing structure as it would be difficult to implement. They were convinced that to be successful, the early, critical phase of the reform process had to be undertaken with a Castro in power. This was because, as noted above, only a Castro has the legitimacy to convince Cubans to accept the third massive reorganization of the economy since 1959. Implicit in this opinion is the recognition that such profound economic change will produce opposition which, if not kept in check, could threaten the success of the reforms and thus the survival of the revolutionary project. In this context, U.S. hostility is apt to remain a useful if not essential tool for mitigating opposition to reform during the first and most difficult years of the process. This reading of the Cuban attitude toward the United States was reinforced by a recitation of the history of Cuban responses to U.S. attempts to reduce bilateral hostility provided by the Chief of the U.S. Mission in Cuba, John Caulfield. We were reminded that President Ford’s efforts to reduce tensions were greeted by Cuba’s decision to send troops to Angola. Carter’s efforts to normalize relations were greeted by the Mariel boatlift. Clinton’s were met by the shooting down of a Brothers to the Rescue plane. Finally, most recently, Obama efforts were greeted by the arrest and imprisonment of a USAID contractor on charges of espionage. Although Caulfield did not explicitly connect the dots, his meaning was clear: Alan Gross was likely arrested either to prevent any reduction in tensions between the two countries or because improving ties with the United States is simply not that important to Cuba. Whatever the reason for Alan Gross’ arrest, it is clear that Cuba is not preoccupied with encouraging the United States to end the embargo. Time and again we were told that economic reform is Cuba’s number one priority—the United States is not. The two countries do cooperate—on hurricane tracking, drug trafficking, migration, and preparing for potential gulf oil spills—but extending and improving bilateral cooperation is not high on the Cuban foreign policy agenda. Instead, Cuban foreign policy continues to emphasize efforts to maintain Cuban sovereignty and identity, which Ambassador Alzugaray noted have historically been most directly threatened by the United States. It is now charged with supporting the economic reform process by promoting foreign direct investment and the diversification of Cuban economic ties. In this context, the only potential role for the United States in the coming years that was mentioned by our Cuban hosts is the growing role of Cuban-American investment in Cuba.

#### History proves Cuba says no

Gutierrez 2008

[Carlos, Commerce Secretary, “HERITAGE FOUNDATION PANEL DISCUSSION; SUBJECT: FREEDOM DENIED: THE COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION; BRIEFERS: COMMERCE SECRETARY CARLOS GUTIERREZ; MARK FALCOFF, RESIDENT SCHOLAR EMERITUS, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE; LEE EDWARDS, DISTINGUISHED FELLOW IN CONSERVATIVE THOUGHT, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION MODERATOR: RAY WALSER, SENIOR POLICY ANALYST FOR LATIN AMERICA, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION; LOCATION: THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.” December 16, Lexis]

Could we conceive, given these domestic and international pressures, if not to lift the embargo, to change the policy somehow, to get off the dime which has been stuck there for a long period of time? Could you conceive of a strategy in which we might begin to relax some aspects of the embargo in return for which Cuba would establish a genuine, better record on human rights and democratization and an opening up of the regime? And could there be some kind of back and forth or quid pro quo that could go on between the two governments? First of all, will the Cubans bite at this prospect? And secondly, could the United States manage it successfully, diplomatically? I wonder if you could put yourselves in the stead, if that's conceivable, of this new incoming administration and think a little bit about the pressures that the new administration will be under and what, let's say, we could still rescue from policy, as it exists at present, even while moving forward on some other fronts. SEC. GUTIERREZ: I'll just take a quick shot at that. The last question, unfortunately, I can't put myself in the shoes of someone who's in the next administration. (Laughter.) But what I will say is, you know, what you just articulated, if they do certain things and maybe liberate political prisoners that perhaps we could do certain things, that's been tried, I would say, dozens of times over the last 50 years. So we have the benefit of history, and we have the benefit of knowing what have been the consequences every time there has been an attempt at outreach and an attempt at getting closer and an attempt at improving the relationship. So if history is a judge of the future, I would say don't trust what you hear coming out of Havana until real change takes place. But what you described has been tried over 50 years. And I don't want to belittle what you said but, with all due respect, there's really nothing new in that notion that perhaps they could do some things, and if they do some things to respect human rights, to open up democracy, to give people certain freedoms, that perhaps we could do certain things. So history would suggest that that's not going to work until certain people are no longer in power.

### A2 Biotech – Repeal Solves

#### Repealing the embargo solves Cuban biotech

Thorsteinsdóttir et al 2004

[Halla Thorsteinsdóttir is Assistant Professor, Canadian Program on Genomics and Global Health, University of Toronto, Tirso W. Sáenz is Associate Senior Researcher, Centro de Desenvolvimento Sustentable, University of Brasilia, Uyen Quach is Research Assistant, Canadian Program on Genomics and Global Health, University of Toronto, Abdallah S. Daar is Director of Ethics and Policy, McLaughlin Centre for Molecular Medicine; Professor of Public Health Sciences and of Surgery, University of Toronto, and Peter A. Singer is Sun Life Financial Chair and Director, University of Toronto, “Cuba—innovation through synergy”, Nature Publishing Group, http://www.sld.cu/galerias/pdf/cuba-innovation\_through\_synergy.pdf]

Lack of funding and the US trade embargo. Despite strong government commitment, Cuba’s health biotechnology sector faces a lack of financial resources. The economic conditions in Cuba are problematic, and the government does not have an impressive track record of building a strong and diversified economy7 . Limited access to international credit has made it harder for the country to engage in ambitious restructuring schemes, such as those taking place in Eastern Europe, and Cuba continues to struggle to pay off its debt. The US trade embargo has limited the economic options for Cuba, including development of the health biotechnology sector. For example, Cuba is forced to import research equipment from countries other than the United States—a situation that not only consumes time but adds to the cost. Another challenge imposed by the poor Cuba-US relations is the increasing difficulty that Cuban scientists face obtaining visas to enter the United States to attend conferences and other related activities. Also, even though the US Treasury Department has as of April 2004 officially permitted papers from embargoed countries to be edited and published in US journals, the uncertainties of the embargo have made it difficult for Cuban papers to be accepted in US journals8 . The embargo therefore restricts the knowledge flow involving Cuban scientists in the international scientific community and adds costs, because Cubans have to attend conferences that are held in countries other than the United States. Another challenge is the dominance of US firms in the global health biotechnology sector. This may limit the options for Cuba in developing joint ventures, strategic alliances and licensing of their technologies.

### A2 FDI Solves Democracy

#### Foreign investment won’t solve democracy – history proves

Werlau 1996

[Maria C., Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, “FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CUBA: THE LIMITS OF COMMERCIAL ENGAGEMENT”, http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume6/pdfs/57Werlau.fm.pdf]

Within the context of Cuba’s liberalizing measures and its opening to foreign investment, the question of external-sector generated influence or pressure for reform should not miss the crucial point. With respect to Cuba, as with other totalitarian systems, the root issue is: if it does, how can it, or will it, actually lead to change? A factor that compounds the dilemma and contradicts the workability of the cause-effect dynamic must be considered: if reforms bring relief, they could actually discourage the need for more reform; if economic pressure diminishes on a leadership bent on self-preservation, the need to take such a high risk can be eliminated. Indeed, the following argument has been put forth: “In fact, foreign investment has been used as a means to avoid or postpone unavoidable and necessary changes, rather than acting as an agent in support of reforms.”225 Particularly, in the aftermath of the February 1996 forceful crackdown on the internal dissident move-ment and the downing of two civilian planes of a Cuban-American group, reform in Cuba seems a distant illusion as the leadership’s priorities have been forcefully reasserted.226 This was further confirmed by Raúl Castro’s speech of March 1996, which delivered a forceful blow to moderates and reformists within the leadership,227 and the July 1996 enactment of a Code of Ethics for Party Members.228 As a result, it looks like little change can be expected short of a dramatic and unexpected turn of events. The people do not have any means to organize an effective opposition movement and are too busy trying to figure out how to get their next meal. The semi-organized dissident movement continues committed solely to peaceful change and has been kept fragmented and repressed by State Security. With the pervasive control of State Security, in allegiance with and dependent on regime survival, it is unlikely that the population, no matter how much it is influenced by market forces, will attain any capacity to demand or impose change. In this scenario, it seems improbable that foreign investment/commercial engagement—especially with its relatively low significance in the Cuban economy—could foster actual reform. Given the depths of the economic and social crisis that Cuba has already endured without an aftermath of consequence, it seems very improbable that any further internal discontent will make a difference. This was poignantly proven when the regime abandoned Communist orthodoxy, which entailed an enormous loss of legitimacy. All the emerging and powerful contradictions to the egalitarian socialist ethos—the debacle on the ideological front, the shocking economic failure of the socialist model, the blatant inequalities of selective capitalism, and the severe hardships that have befallen the population—have not been able to generate a change in the repressive nature of the regime. As long as the regime retains the means of control, the instruments of legitimization can be manipulated. Because in Cuba power is strongly centralized and forcefully exercised, and decision-making is very vertical, market forces, which operate spontaneously and in a decentralized manner, are inherently constrained. This negates the main theoretical argument for engagement and renders it essentially flawed at the core. Foreign investment in Cuba is, in essence, hostage to the prevailing dialectic. A recent analysis on China concludes that economic engagement has also failed to bring about political moderation and a modicum of pluralism there because the three elements that would foster reform—the rule of law, political accountability and a free press—challenge the security of the regime and are, thus, banned. A prominent scholar on Asia declares: “If China is permitted to merely pick and choose which aspects of integration it finds palatable, and to resist those that push change in the direction of moderation and plualism, them the time scale required by economic engagement will stretch toward infinity.”229 The same selective approach to capitalist mechanisms is the one applied by the Cuban leadership, and it has been effective. A systematically repressive apparatus appears to have tremendous impact on the feasibility and timing of political change regardless of economic reform. The Cuban people simply do not possess the means to exercise self-determination. When the leadership is committed to survival at all costs, regime legitimization is not the issue; the issue is capacity to exercise control.

#### Repeal won’t solve the economy or spread democracy – empirically proven

Suchlicki 2010

[Jamie, Professor of History and Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban American Studies at the University of Miami, “American Tourists Won't Bring Democracy to Cuba”, Targeted News Service, Lexis]

The assumption that tourism or trade will lead to economic and political change is not borne out by serious studies. In Eastern Europe, communism collapsed a decade after tourism peaked. No study of Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union claims that tourism, trade or investments had anything to do with the end of communism. A disastrous economic system, competition with the West, successive leadership changes with no legitimacy, a corrupt and weak Communist Party, anti-Soviet feeling in Eastern Europe and the failed Soviet war in Afghanistan were among the reasons for change. The repeated statement that the embargo is the cause of Cuba's economic problems is hollow. The reasons for the economic misery of the Cubans are a failed political and economic system. Like the communist systems of Eastern Europe, Cuba's system does not function, stifles initiative and productivity and destroys human freedom and dignity. As occurred in the mid-1990s, an infusion of American tourist dollars will provide the regime with a further disincentive to adopt deeper economic reforms. Cuba's limited economic reforms were enacted in the early 1990s, when the island's economic contraction was at its worst. Once the economy began to stabilize by 1996 as a result of foreign tourism and investments, and exile remittances, the earlier reforms were halted or rescinded by Castro. The assumption that the Cuban leadership would allow U.S. tourists or businesses to subvert the revolution and influence internal developments is at best naive. American tourists will have limited contact with Cubans. Most Cuban resorts are built in isolated areas, are off limits to the average Cuban, and are controlled by Cuba's efficient security apparatus. Most Americans don't speak Spanish, have but limited contact with ordinary Cubans, and are not interested in visiting the island to subvert its regime. Law 88 enacted in 1999 prohibits Cubans from receiving publications from tourists. Penalties include jail terms. Money from American tourists would flow into businesses owned by the Castro government thus strengthening state enterprises. The tourist industry is controlled by the military and General Raul Castro, Fidel's brother. While providing the Castro government with much needed dollars, the economic impact of tourism on the Cuban population would be limited. Dollars will trickle down to the Cuban poor in only small quantities, while state and foreign enterprises will benefit most. Tourist dollars would be spent on products, i.e., rum, tobacco, etc., produced by state enterprises, and tourists would stay in hotels owned partially or wholly by the Cuban government. The principal airline shuffling tourists around the island, Gaviota, is owned and operated by the Cuban military. Once American tourists begin to visit Cuba, Castro would restrict travel by Cuban-Americans. For the Castro regime, Cuban-Americans represent a far more subversive group because of their ability to speak to friends and relatives on the island, and to influence their views on the Castro regime and on the United States. Indeed, the return of Cuban exiles in 1979-80 precipitated the mass exodus of Cubans from Mariel in 1980.